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I. INTRODUCTION
The phrase "due process of law" is a modification of the correlative
expression "by law of the land" which appears in the Magna Carta. This
modification was first manifested in legislation enacted by Edward III to
protect his subjects. In English law the two expressions had the same
meaning, and were directed to limit action by the crown.'
Courts in the United States have approved the doctrine that the
import of the phrase "due process of law" must be defined by the gradual
process of judicial inclusion and exclusion as cases are presented for
decision.2
Both the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, and
the Florida Constitution, section 12 of the Declaration of Rights, guar-
antee the concept of substantive due process to citizens of the state of
Florida as a safeguard against state actions. To the United States Su-
preme Court, under Fourteenth substantive due process, a state statute is
valid if the Court "can conceive of any facts" which will demonstrate
its reasonableness. The Florida Supreme Court treats substantive due
process as a more severe limitation than the federal courts on the scope of
the state's "police power." In order to be valid the action of the state
must be reasonable in the sense that it must be related to the "health,
safety, morals or general welfare" of the citizens of Florida. Thus, it is
easier for a citizen to obtain an invalidation under Florida due process
concepts than it is under federal due process. The national Supreme Court
can usually conceive of facts that will demonstrate reasonableness of a
state law. The Florida Supreme Court, on the other hand, has less in-
clination to invent or discover a reasonable relationship between the law
being tested and the "health, safety, morals or general welfare" of the
state's citizenry. The state court must both know of the reasonableness
and approve it.
Under Florida's substantive due process guarantee, a law cannot be
saved which is found to be "unreasonable" or "arbitrary." These oft
used terms imply that the state cannot justify the law's utility or defeat
the affected citizen's claim that the operation of the law has an unneces-
sarily harsh, cruel or invidious impact upon him.
1. State v. Dowling, 92 Fla. 848, 110 So. 522 (1926).
2. Ibid. See South Fla. Trust Co. v. Miami Coliseum Corp., 101 Fla. 1351, 133 So. 334
(1931). The court cites Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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Florida courts do, however, recognize a duty to construe a statute
so as to save it from constitutional infirmities. Thus if a statute is suscep-
tible to several interpretations, the language is construed to uphold its
validity.3 Furthermore, the state's police power is treated as non-static in
nature and the courts "recognize its expansion in proper cases to meet
conditions which necessarily change as business progresses and civilization
advances."'
It has been said that the principle of due process of law secures to
the citizen the right against any arbitrary legislation. This does not
deprive the state of the power to regulate as such, but it does require the
state to insure that the ends sought by legislation will be accomplished
by methods consistent with due process.5
Having expressed these general principles, this examination will
proceed to the judicial concept of substantive due process in a number of
more specific areas of legislation.
II. SPENDING, DISPOSING, BORROWING AND TAXING IN FLORIDA
A. Generally
Article IX, section 10 of the Florida Constitution provides that:
The credit of the State shall not be pledged or loaned to any in-
dividual, company, corporation or association. . . .The legisla-
ture shall not authorize any county, city, borough, township or
incorporated district ... to obtain or appropriate money for, or
loan its credit to, any corporation, association, institution or
individual.
The Supreme Court of Florida has used this limitation as a vehicle
to articulate the so-called "public purpose doctrine." Under this doctrine
the state must tax, for a public, as opposed to a private purpose.' At
times, however, the Florida Supreme Court has resolved the issues in
terms of substantive due process, when determining whether or not a
particular case involves a valid public purpose.
In an historically focused opinion,' Mr. Justice Terrell pointed out
that section 10 of Article IX was first adopted in 1875. The reason for
its adoption was that prior to its enactment state, county and city gov-
ernments by legislation had become stockholders or bondholders, or in
other ways had become financially interested in the organization and
3. Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Mason, 177 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1965); Smith v. Ayres, 174
So.2d 727 (Fla. 1965).
4. L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 577, 139 So. 121, 131 (1931). "The police power
has its origin, purpose and scope in the general welfare of the state."
5. Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 208 F. Supp. 899 (N.D. Fla. 1962).
6. Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685
(1962).
7. Bailey v. City of Tampa, 92 Fla. 1030, 111 So. 119 (1926).
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operation of railroads, banks and other private commercial institutions.
The essential purpose of the amendment was "to restrict the activities
and functions of the state, county, and municipality to that of govern-
ment, and forbid their engaging directly or indirectly in commercial enter-
prises for profit." 8
The Florida Supreme Court has explicitly held that under both sub-
stantive due process and Article IX, section 10, the expenditure of public
money for a private purpose is invalid. Whether the money is derived by
ad valorem taxes, by gift, or otherwise does not matter. In Florida
public money cannot be appropriated for a private purpose or used to
acquire property for the benefit of a private concern. Mr. Justice
Mathews emphatically summarized the position:
It does not matter that such undertakings may be called or how
worthwhile they may appear at the passing moment. The financ-
ing of private enterprises by means of public funds is entirely
foreign to a proper concept of our constitutional system. Ex-
perience has shown that such encroachments will lead inevitably
to the ultimate destruction of the private enterprise system.'
B. Spending, Disposing and Borrowing
Unless expressly authorized by legislation, a municipality may not
donate money, issue bonds, subscribe to stock, or otherwise aid a private
corporation, notwithstanding the fact that the municipality may be
incidentally benefited by the location of the company in the area.1" The
same rule applies to the other divisions of the state government. The
problem as it affects this discussion, is whether or not once granted such
a legislative delegation of power is valid under the Florida Constitution.
City of Bradenton v. State" involved the validation of bonds issued
by a municipality, the proceeds of which were to be used for the main-
tenance and enlargement of a golf course in the city for the benefit of a
private chartered golf club. The court held that although the city may
have the power to purchase and maintain a golf course owned and
operated by the city, it could not use the proceeds for the purpose in-
tended. The purpose was not sufficiently "public." In a similar case
involving a golf course the court clearly expressed its reasons for holding
such bond issues invalid.12 The court was afraid that if the taxpayer's
money could be diverted to finance a private golf course, then nothing
would prevent a city from financing private billiard parlors, dance halls,
baseball teams, or establishing private drugstores and automobile busi-
nesses.
8. Id. at 1035, 111 So., at 120.
'9. State v. Town of No. Miami, 59 So.2d 779, 785 (Fla. 1952).
10. 5 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 1298 (2d ed. 1947).
11. 88 Fla. 381, 102 So. 556 (1924).
12. City of Daytona Beach v. King, 132 Fla. 273, 181 So. 1 (1938).
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A case involving a similar invalidation on different facts is Brumby
v. City of Clearwater." The city attempted to spend public funds for the
purpose of dredging a channel and basin for the use of an individual to
carry on a private business. Even though the contract referred to the
enterprise as a public utility, it was invalid because the terms of the con-
tract showed its purpose was to provide facilities for the operation of a
private business for profit.
In the leading case of State v. Town of No. Miami, 4 proposed certi-
ficates of indebtedness were to be issued by the municipality; the pro-
ceeds were to be used to acquire land, and to erect an aluminum plant
thereon. Thereafter, the city planned to rent the project to a private
industry. The court determined that neither the legislative spending nor
eminent domain powers could sustain such an expenditure of public funds.
The proposed lease of such property to a private corporation for private
profit was in direct violation of the constitutional provision against the
lending of credit. 5
More recently, the supreme court demonstrated that it still ad-
heres to this "public purpose doctrine." The court invalidated county
revenue certificates in the 1962 case of State v. Clay County Dev.
Authority. 6 Here the Authority acquired a surplus airfield and entered
into a contract with a private company whereby the Authority agreed to
build an industrial plant on a portion of the field; in return the company
was to enter into a lease for the property. The cost of the project was to
be financed by issuing revenue anticipation certificates. During the term
of the lease, the company was to have exclusive use and control over the
premises. In reversing a district court decision, the supreme court stated
that the plan violated the constitutional proscription against lending of
credit by a county. Noting that the only possible public purpose would be
promotion of employment in the county, the court stated that the domi-
nant and paramount purpose obviously was to finance a private enter-
prise for private profit. The fact that only a small portion of the land was
being used for this purpose did not deter the court's invalidation. In
dissent the late Mr. Justice Terrell argued for an end to such curbs on
the power of smaller counties to create an attractive climate for new
business.1
7
To illustrate some valid public purposes State v. City of Tallahas-
see'8 is an appropriate starting point. In this case there was a specific
13" 108 Fla. 633, 149 So. 203 (1933).
14. 59 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
15. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 10.
16. 140 So.2d 576 (Fla. 1962).
17. Mr. Justice Terrell's dissent is well worth reading. One case mentioned in it was
State v. Cotney, 104.So.2d 346 (Fla. 1958) in which the court had upheld a statute creating
an authority with a power to lease portions of surplus land to private concerns for con-
struction of industrial and commercial plants.
18. 142 Fla. 476, 195 So. 402 (1940). See Buchanan v. City of Miami, 49 So.2d 336
(Fla. 1950) (sewage disposal plant held to be a governmental function).
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legislative determination that the erection of an office building in the
capital would serve a public purpose. Erection of the building in question
served both a state and municipal purpose. In validating, the court held
that the state was not a corporation within the meaning of Article IX,
section 10 of the constitution and actions such as those involved were
in pursuance of a valid public purpose.
In another case the city of Fernandina contracted to pay for services
rendered in bringing about the location of pulp and paper mills in the
city.19 It offered no inducement to location of the mills in the area other
than its natural advantages. A special act authorized issuance of funding
bonds for the funding of the city's indebtedness, including indebtedness
for the services. In validating the bonds the supreme court took the posi-
tion that the city was not lending its credit. The city did not buy the land,
erect the buildings, own any stock in the corporation, nor lend its credit
or property to the corporation. It was a valid function for the city to ad-
vertise its assets, since the only inducements it offered were natural ad-
vantages, not economic ones.
When land was deeded by the United States Government to a county
for a "public purpose," a question arose as to the validity of a special act
authorizing the issuance of revenue certificates to accomplish the develop-
ment of recreational projects on the beaches. In State v. Escambia
County, ° authority was granted by the legislature for the construction of
facilities on the beaches for recreational purposes and these activities
were held to be for a public purpose. There was no suggestion that the
beaches would be used or developed for the use of private corporations
for private profit or gain. Therefore, recreational facilities are a proper
matter for expenditure of public funds.
An important step was taken by the Supreme Court of Florida in
State v. Dade County." In that case the court recognized that Miami has
the potential of becoming a great air transportation center and that
Florida is a port of entry for air transportation from South and Central
America, the West Indies, and Africa. The airport in question was to be
publicly owned and operated, and air transportation was found to be a
19. City of Fernandina v. State, 143 Fla. 802, 197 So. 454 (1940).
20. 52 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1951). See also State v. City of Jacksonville, 53 So.2d 306, 307
(Fla. 1951), where the city acquired real estate under a special act, for the extension of
recreational facilities. In holding the special act valid, and that the issuance of certificates of
indebtedness were for a municipal purpose the court said:
Athletic sports have long been required as part of the public school and community
program and they are being provided everywhere . . . . What the city is proposing
here is in harmony with municipal and community programs in every progressive
locality and are generally approved.
[S]tate and City legislatures have found that recreational facilities are proper
subjects for the expenditure of public funds. It is a proper exercise of legislative
power and so long as reasonable and in the range of legislative ambit this court is
without power to strike it down.
21. 157 Fla. 859, 27 So.2d 283 (1946).
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public purpose. The court stated that in developing this airport, and in
owning and operating it, Miami could not be said to be serving anything
other than a public and municipal purpose. It did not seem to disturb
the court that much of the airport facilities would be leased to private
enterprise.
When the purpose of the Inter-American Center Authority in Dade
County was brought into issue it was also found to be on the public
side.22 Under legislative authorization the Authority sought to issue bonds
to finance the construction of an Inter-American Trade Center. The
court validated the issue by characterizing the legislative objectives as a
"public purpose" in that the property was to be put to an educational and
scientific use. In addition the Center's tourist attraction possibilities
would economically benefit Florida, and this was the factor which
weighed heavily with the court in reaching its decision. Again, private
leaseholds for profit did not inhibit the court's determination.
It has generally been held that if the constitutional provision against
the lending of credit is not to be violated a proposed plan which benefits
private enterprise must be a "pure incident" of a public purpose, and it
must not destroy the "main or primary purpose," which must be
"public."23
In State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist.,24
bonds were issued to construct and operate racing and recreational facili-
ties, to be governed by the establishment of a governmental district. The
court in validating the bond issue found the purpose to be predominantly
public, and the district's desire to lease the facilities for six months each
year to a private corporation was also classified so that the "private
benefit" was merely "incidental" to the public purpose.
In State v. Suwannee County Dev. Authority,25 an authority was
created to plan and develop Suwannee County. It had the power to ac-
quire real estate, construct projects, and lease or make contracts with
respect to them in any manner the Authority deemed appropriate. The
case involved the question of whether or not the proceeds from the sale
of certificates could be used to purchase land and construct buildings for
22. State v. Inter-Am. Center Authority, 143 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1962); State v. Inter-Am.
Center Authority, 84 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1955).
23. State v. Clay County Dev. Authority, 140 So.2d 576 (Fla. 1962).
24. 89 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1956).
25. 122 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1960). In its decision the court distinguished State v. Cotney,
supra note 17, on the following grounds: (1) No proposed issue of revenue certificates
was before the court in that case and; (2) In Cotney, the Development Authority had already
acquired a tract of surplus land from the federal government and it proposed to develop
that land as one project, including an airport and golf course, with the remainder to be
sold or leased to private enterprise for commercial use; (3) There was nothing in the
record of Cotney to show that the leasing or selling to private enterprises "for private use"
of a portion of the lands was the "primary purpose" for the acquisition of the land. Alloway
& Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, 16 U. MmI LAW 685 (1962).
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the use of private enterprise as a "public" instead of a "private" pur-
pose. In invalidating, the court stated that it believed that the certificate
proceeds would be used for a private rather than a public purpose.
Finally, in Wiggins v. City of Green Cove Springs,26 the issuance of
revenue certificates to finance a purchase by the city of a deactivated
naval station was held to be primarily for municipal purposes. Any
private purpose temporarily served by the leasing for private use of
the buildings or facilities which were not essential to municipal purposes
at the present time was purely incidental to the public improvement and
did not invalidate the certificates.
These cases demonstrate that when there is a private use involved
with public funds it must be incidental to a valid "public purpose." The
primary purpose must still be public for an act to be valid with respect to
spending, borrowing and pledging.27 This generalization is, of course,
somewhat meaningless. For example, how can one justify, by reference
to the generalization, the action of the court in treating public funding
to end depressed economic conditions in a county as a "private" purpose




As Colbert, the Minister of Louis XIV put it, "The science of tax-
ation consists of getting the most feathers from the goose with the least
amount of squawking."29
The Florida Supreme Court requires that taxes bear equally, or
as equally as possible, on all taxpayer classes, and that taxes be im-
posed only for support of legitimate expenses of the government and to
promote the general welfare. Furthermore, taxes may be burdensome in
nature, but they may not become confiscatory. °
Likewise, in Florida, the purpose for which a tax is laid must be a
26. 159 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1963).
27. The expending or spending power for a public purpose has been held valid in
various instances. E.g., expenditures of county funds for a hog cholera innoculation program
to supplement an expenditure of state funds to accomplish a program which served both a
state and county purpose, Bedenbaugh v. Adams, 88 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1956) ; legislation pro-
viding for widows of circuit judges whose death occurred before they were eligible to retire
or after they retired, Greene v. Gray, 87 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1956) ; municipal contract to expend
money of the city by furnishing a utility, in this case water, as an inducement for the
establishment of a university in the city, City of Gainesville v. Board of Control, 81 So.2d
514 (Fla. 1955).
28. For a more extensive treatment of the public purpose doctrine see Tew, Industrial
Bond Financing & the Florida Public Purpose Doctrine, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 171 (1966).




"public" one.31 Taxation for other than a public purpose is a taking of
property without due process and is therefore invalid.
In State v. City of Stuart,32 the court stated that two questions are
generally raised when the legislature exercises its power of taxation; first,
whether the purpose of the burden is public, and second, if public
whether the burden is one which should properly be borne by the district
upon which it is imposed. If the answer to either of these questions is
in the negative, then the legislation violates substantive due process in
Florida.
2. TAX DISTRICTS
With regard to taxing districts the geographical dimensions of a
taxing unit should be confined to a designated district or subdivision
whose inhabitants may be directly or peculiarly benefited by the appli-
cation of the tax money for the intended purpose. The fact that persons
not taxed may be benefited by a public undertaking does not affect the
taxing power." The court has repeatedly held that it is within the power
of the legislature to establish a district as a governmental agency "to
effect the lawful public purpose of conserving the public health, com-
fort, convenience, and welfare of the district and its inhabitants. ... ",
The Supreme Court of Florida has consistently decided that the
legislature has the power to create special taxing districts with the
power to levy an ad valorem tax.
In Miller v. Ryan,"5 the legislature passed an act authorizing the
County Commissioners of Volusia County to levy a tax for the purpose
of advertising the advantages, facilities, and products of various taxing
districts set up by the commissioners. The commission established the
31. Burnett v. Greene, 97 Fla. 1007, 122 So. 570 (1929). See City of Daytona Beach v.
King, 132 Fla. 273, 181 So. 1 (1938). In speaking of public purpose the court said:
[Tihe determination of the legislature on this question (public purpose) is not, like
its decision on ordinary questions of public policy, conclusive either on the other
departments of government, or on the people. The question, what is and what is
not a public purpose, is one of law; and though unquestionably the legislature has
large discretion in selecting the object for which taxes shall be laid, its decision is
not final. In any case in which the legislature shall have clearly exceeded its authority
in this regard, and levied a tax for a purpose not public, it is competent for anyone
who in person or property is affected by the tax, to appeal to the courts for pro-
tection. Id. at 283, 181 So., at 5.
32. 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335 (1929). The constitutional provision against the taking of
property without just compensation does not apply when the state exercises a legitimate
facet of its police power such as taxation, because in such a situation there is no taking.
33. Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839 (1920).
34. Id. at 829, 86 So., at 844.
35. 54 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1951). Compare Paul Bros. v. Long Beach & L.S. Rd. & Bridge
Dist., 83 Fla. 706, 92 So. 687 (1922). In this case an act purporting to create a special road
and bridge district was found so arbitrary and oppressive in the tax burdens it imposed
upon the lands in the district that it was an abuse of the police and taxing powers of the
state and the court held that such an action would deprive landowners of their property
in violation of the constitution.
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separate taxing districts, held referendum elections, and imposed taxes
on property owners in those districts approving the tax. In validating
the action the court held that a tax for the purpose of financing adver-
tising is constitutional, and that since the tax only applied to those dis-
tricts which approved, it was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
3. PUBLIC PURPOSE DOCTRINE
It is simple to illustrate the public purpose doctrine as it relates to
taxation. The supreme court in C. V. Floyd Fruit Co. v. Florida Citrus
Comm'n"6 held that a tax imposed on each standard-packed box of
oranges, grapefruit and tangerines grown in the state, for the purpose of
providing funds for advertising the citrus industry in Florida, was a
matter of public concern. Therefore, advertising was a proper method
for promoting the public welfare and a tax levied to provide funds for
advertising served a public purpose.
An illustration of an invalid tax appears in the case of Olds v.
Alvord. 7 There the court issued a final decree restraining the town and
its officers from levying any tax on property in the town. The proceeds
were to be used to pay the principal and interest on bonds which were
to be utilized to construct streets and highways in a private real estate
development, and to improve the waterfront property of a private hotel.
Such a tax was found to be in violation of the constitution, Article IX,
section 10, as a tax levied for a private instead of a public purpose.
As in State v. Dade County,38 the supreme court in Seaboard Air
Line R. Co. v. Peters9 demonstrated its cognizance of the importance
of air transportation. Revenue certificates were issued by the Dade
County Port Authority to finance the acquisition and development of
additional land essential to safe operation of the International Airport.
The revenue certificates were to be payable out of a special fund con-
sisting of net profits from the operation of the airport and from proceeds
of an ad valorem tax to be levied for such purposes. The court in validat-
ing the tax reiterated its position that airports render a public service
which promotes the general welfare.
Recently, in Knight Wall Co. v. Bryant" the supreme court upheld
a statute which levied a tax on manufacturers of fishing, hunting, camp-
ing, and swimming and diving equipment. The court validated on the
basis that the objects sought to be taxed were those used in outdoor
36. 128 Fla. 565, 175 So. 248 (1937).
37. 133 Fla. 221, 183 So. 711 (1938), rehearing granted, 136 Fla. 549, 188 So. 652
(1938), modified on other grounds, 139 Fla. 745, 191 So. 434 (1939), cert. denied, 308 US.
603 (1939).
38. 157 Fla. 859, 27 So.2d 283 (1946).
39. 43 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1949).
40. 178 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1965).
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activities which utilized the natural resources of the state. The funds
derived from the tax were to be used to finance programs under the
Outdoor Recreation and Conservation Act of 1963. The court indulged
in the judicial presumption that all acts of the legislature are presumed
valid unless determined invalid beyond a reasonable doubt, and sus-
tained the statute on the basis that it was reasonable in this instance.
III. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Generally
The superior dominion, "the eminent domain," which the state holds
over all land within its bounds, is part of the state's police power; it is
an inherent aspect of the state's sovereignty which may be exercised for
the public good. 41 It is, therefore, limited by the constitution, but not
created by it.4 Moreover, the power can be exercised without the pay-
ment of any compensation to the owner of the land taken, absent a
contrary provision in the constitution. Thus in earlier days it was com-
mon practice to take land for highways without compensation to the
owner of the land, the state relying for such confiscation either on the
long established practice predicated on the slight value of the land and
the general need for roads, or relying on public rights reserved in the
grant of all lands.4
The fact that private property should not be "taken" without com-
pensation was considered so fundamental a requirement of natural justice
that almost all of the states included provisions in the statutory law
which forbade the taking of private property without just compensation.
Such a provision has been part of Florida's law since 1835. It has been
included in each of Florida's constitutions and is now found incorporated
as section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the presently effective
Constitution of 1885. Section 12 provides in the traditional manner that
private property shall not be taken "without just compensation." A
second limitation was also adopted relating to the exercise of the right
of eminent domain, namely Article XVI, section 29. It appears by the
latter provision (that private property shall not be appropriated to
the use of any corporation or individual until full compensation has been
paid to the owner) that the framers of the Constitution of 1885 intended
to specify an additional statutory limitation upon the exercise of eminent
domain, as well as a limitation upon the "taking" of private property
under the state's police power. Clarifying the meaning of Article XVI,
section 29, the Supreme Court of Florida in Daniels v. State Rd. Dep't44
41. The power of eminent domain is an attribute of state sovereignty and absolute,
except as limited by the constitution. Demeter Land Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Co., 99 Fla.
954, 128 So. 402 (1930). See also United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883).
42. Spafford v. Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So. 451 (1926).
43. Daniels v. State Rd. Dep't, 170 So.2d 846 (Fla. 1964).
44. 170 So.2d 846 (Fla. 1964).
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held that the provision applies only to private corporations and indi-
viduals, not to the state, its agencies or its political subdivisions.
The power of eminent domain is distinguished from the police power
to regulate in that under eminent domain physical possession and use of
property are taken from a private owner and transferred to the public
or one of its agencies. Under the police power the government at times
may regulate or even destroy private property in the interest of the
public welfare.4" Compensation is required when the state "takes" private
property under eminent domain, but compensation is not required when
the state regulates property under the police power. Property rights are
held subject to the exercise of the police power which is reasonably
necessary to secure the general welfare of the state; when private in-




When an eminent domain statute is read in connection with the
section of the Declaration of Rights dealing with substantive due process
(section 12) and the constitutional provision that no private property
or right of way shall be appropriated until full compensation shall first
be made to the owner (Article XVI, section 29), they are interpreted to
mean, inter alia, than when private property is "taken" it must be taken
for a "public use or purpose," not a private use or purpose. Likewise
when the state "takes" private property for a public use, the state must
fully compensate the owner for it.47
An early case48 established the Florida position with regard to the
public purpose limitation on eminent domain. The case involved the
45. See generally 6 FLA. JUR. Constitutional Law § 192 (1956).
46. Cason v. Florida Power Co., 74 Fla. 1, 76 So. 535 (1917) (dam involved) ; Dutton
Phosphate Co. v. Priest, 67 Fla. 370, 65 So. 282 (1914) (cattle fell into pit). See also the
recent case of Coast Cities Coaches, Inc. v. Dade County, 178 So.2d 703 (Fla. 1965). The
county sought a declaratory decree determining the legality of the proposed extension of
the county's transit system within the county. The court affirmed the lower court's finding
that the county possessed the power, privilege and right to extend its business transportation
system into all parts of the area within which the private company was presently operating
and could so compete without any obligation to compensate the private company. The court
was of the opinion that loss of business through competition with a governmental agency, is
not a taking of private property in violation of § 12 of the Declaration of Rights.
47. Marvin v. Housing Authority of Jacksonville, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145 (1938).
48. Demeter Land Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Co., 99 Fla. 954, 128 So. 402 (1930). For
cases concerning drainage operations see Arundel Corp. v. Griffin, 89 Fla. 128, 103 So. 422
(1925); Everglades Sugar & Land Co. v. Bryan, 81 Fla. 75, 87 So. 68 (1921). In Davis v.
Florida Power Co., 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759 (1913) the court stated that the discretion of the
legislature when exercised for the public welfare in selecting the subject of police regulations
and in determining the nature and extent of such regulations is limited only by the require-
ments of the fundamental law that the regulations shall not invade private rights secured by
the constitution, and shall not be merely arbitrary in applying to some persons and not
to others similarly situated.
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exercise of the eminent domain power for a public work. The court held
that property sought to be appropriated for constructing, maintaining
and operating public works could be taken only for a public use, a use
which would justify condemnation by the public work because the pub-
lic had an interest in the project. However, the court did state that the
use need not be exclusively for public benefit, and hence there can be
some incidental private gain in the exercise of eminent domain.4"
2. DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY
An interesting situation was presented by the State Plant Board
cases." In these cases the Board's "pull and treat" program was chal-
lenged. Legislation characterized as a public nuisance any plant infested
with or exposed to infestation of the burrowing nematode. An emergency
condition in the citrus industry was declared by the legislature because
of the decline in production caused by these nematodes. The Board
authorized removal and burning in all infested citrus zones. If the court
classified the legislature's program as an exercise of police power, com-
pensation would not be required to the owners; however, if classified as
a "taking" or under eminent domain, compensation would be required.
The supreme court required compensation to be paid to the grove owners
for destruction of "healthy trees" which, while not infected, had been
exposed to the infection. The court thus established a standard. Only in
the most extreme emergencies could the state destroy private property
to protect the property of a neighbor, without compensation. Therefore,
the state's police power to regulate, exercised without the aspect of
just compensation, violated section 12 of the Declaration of Rights.
Due process demanded just compensation to the owners of trees destroyed
by the state.
In the recent case of Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Nay. Con-
trol Authority,51 it was held that a denial of permission to fill bottom
land, to permit extension of a trailer park situated on the plaintiff's
49. The Supreme Court of Florida in an early decision invalidated the actions of the
county in Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 31 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1947), and held
that hunting and fishing were not county purposes and had no relation to public health,
morals or safety. The use of land for such purposes was stated to be a private use of land
not a public one, and hence the county in the exercise of its delegated police power could not
condemn the land to provide a hunting and fishing area as a public facility. But see Knight
Wall Co. v. Bryant, .178 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1965) for a more realistic attitude towards hunting
and fishing and the use of natural resources as "public purposes."
50. Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1957). See also State Plant Bd. v.
Smith, 110 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1959), which involved the same facts as the Corneal case. The
court used § 12 of the Declaration of Rights, and art. XVI, § 29 of the Florida Constitution.
The court invalidated the legislation as an exercise of the police power to this extent: (1)
Since the legislation limited compensation to one thousand dollars for owners of uninfected
trees, per acre; (2) Since the legislature provided that no compensation should be made to
owners of infected trees, even if the trees were still "commercially profitable." See Alloway
& Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, 16 U. MIAmi L. REV. 685 (1962).
51. 171 So.2d 376 (Fla. 1965).
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upland property along shore, amounted to a taking of property with-
out just compensation. It was not established to the court that granting
of the permit would materially and adversely affect public interest. By
the prohibition upon filling and dredging, the owner was deprived of a
valuable use of his property. The court stated that the regulation could
not be valid unless an "overriding public necessity" could be demon-
strated to support it. The court established these constitutional ground
rules in testing the validity of regulations: If the regulatory measures
protect, but do not destroy property, the legislature need not restrict
itself to conditions actually harmful but may require precautions with-
in the whole range of possible danger. On the other hand, the absolute
destruction of a valuable property right, albeit potential, is an extreme
act of the police power which is justified only within the narrowest
limits of actual necessity. Absent such necessity the state must pay just
compensation for the taking.
3. PRIVATE USE
The police power under substantive due process cannot sustain
action whereby land is taken from one private owner for the use of
another private owner. In the case of South Dade Farms v. B & L Farms
Co.,52 the court invalidated, under substantive due process, a taking from
one private owner for the use of another pursuant to a statute permitting
the owners of shut-off lands having no practicable route to the nearest
road to use an easement over the lands between the shut-off lands and
such roads.
4. TRESPASS
In White v. Pinellas County," a county employee allegedly tres-
passed on private land during maintenance operations on an adjacent
right-of-way and caused some damage to the trespassed property. The
court held that the trespass was not an exercise of the power of eminent
domain, hence, there was no expropriation or taking for a public use.
The court held that in an action ex delicto there must be circumstances
which bring the cause within the exception to sovereign immunity. The
pleadings and proof must demonstrate a taking for a public purpose, not
merely a trespass unrelated to the legitimate governmental power over
private property in order to obtain compensation.
5. SLUM CLEARANCE
The cases in the area of slum clearance show an interesting history.
Marvin v. Housing Authority of Jacksonville54 was the first slum clear-
52. 62 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1952).
53. 174 So.2d 88 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). See, e.g., Arundel Corp. v. Griffin, 89 Fla. 128, 103
So. 422 (1925).
54. 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145 (1938).
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ance and public housing case decided in Florida. In the Marvin case an
act created the housing authority which had the power to undertake
slum clearance and exercise eminent domain. The act was found valid
under substantive due process despite the contention that low cost hous-
ing and slum clearance was not a public purpose. The court found that
the project provided for "better citizenship, better notions of necessity
for law and order, and a sounder and saner patriotism."5
The next case decided was Adams v. Housing Authority.56 As a re-
sult of this decision for a long time thereafter it was impossible for
local governments in Florida to acquire a depressed area, plan an appro-
priate development, rezone, and sell or lease the project to private enter-
prise to be used in accordance with the new zoning. The theory of the
Adams case was that the police power, aided by eminent domain, was
restricted to a public use or public purpose. The court believed that a
public use would not be found when property was taken by eminent
domain, rezoned, and sold or leased to private enterprise under a new
plan. This case appeared to proclaim an end to major slum clearance pro-
grams in Florida.
However, the Supreme Court of Florida in Grubstein v. Urban
Renewal Agency 7 finally broke the barrier apparently erected by the
Adams case. In Grubstein the City of Tampa approved a plan for
clearance and redevelopment of a slum area within the city. The area
was to be returned primarily to private residential use after the redevel-
opment. The question in the case was whether this exercise of the eminent
domain power qualified as a public purpose.5" The court declared that a
public purpose does exist when eminent domain is used for slum clear-
ance and construction of low-rental public housing, and similarly exists
when it is used to condemn slum areas which will thereafter provide for
private ownership and development. In either instance, the court found
that the principal and public effect is the removal of a breeding place for
crime and disease, thereby promoting the "health, safety, morals and
general welfare" of the people. The court went on to indicate that
though incidental benefits might inure to private individuals or cor-
porations under an urban renewal law, if slum clearance is the dominant
or primary purpose the plan, including the redevelopment scheme, may be
regarded as public.
55. Id. at 605, 183 So., at 151. See Lott v. City of Orlando, 142 Fla. 338, 196 So. 313
(1939). The action of the city under a statute relating to municipal housing authorities, in
establishing a housing authority to carry out housing projects for low income classes was an
"action taken for a public purpose." The slums would be made safe and sanitary, preventing
crime and the spread of disease.
56. 60 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
57. 115 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1959).
58. Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, 16 U. MiASi L. REv. 685
(1962).
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As a result of this decision two important requirements emerge with
reference to urban renewal laws: (1) Evidence tendered by the local
government must not only indicate that slum clearance is necessary, but
also that it is the purpose and objective of the entire project; (2) Evi-
dence should also demonstrate that the major purpose of the slum
clearance and redevelopment is principally for public as opposed to
private benefit. 9 The Adams case, however, remains in effect with ref-
erence to blighted areas; areas as to which the local government simply
contends or believes that the land could be used in a more efficient or
economical manner.6 The area to be redeveloped must apparently be
more than "blighted;" it must be a "slum."
C. Valuation
1. VALUE OF PROPERTY
In Sunday v. Louisville & Nashville Ry.,6' the court held that an
increase in value of lands, occurring in anticipation of a proposed im-
provement, was a factor to be considered in determining the compensa-
tion to be paid for taken land. While this case has been distinguished,"2
it has never been explicitly overruled and appears to still be the law.
In the landmark case of Yoder v. Sarasota County,63 the compensa-
tion awarded a property owner had been based upon the "value" of the
property as it was utilized at the time it was lawfully appropriated. On
appeal, the court held that evidence should be entered to indicate the
uses to which the property was or might reasonably be applied. How-
ever, the court also stated that it was not proper to enter speculative
evidence on what could be done to make the land more valuable. Where
the value is depreciated because of the imminence of a taking, compen-
sation is to be fixed at a time prior to the effect of the prospect of con-
demnation. The point in time to fix value was said to be "when the
condemnation suit is filed in the proper court."6 4
"Value" in most condemnation actions today is generally defined as
the amount which would be paid on the assessing date to a willing seller
not compelled to sell, by a willing purchaser not compelled to purchase,
considering all the uses to which the property reasonably is adapted.6
59. Ibid. Particularly emphasized in Thornal's concurring opinion in the Grubstein case
supra note 57, at 752.
60. Supra note 58, at 718.
61. 62 Fla. 395, 57 So. 351 (1912).
62. State Rd. Dep't v. Chicone, 158 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1963).
63. 81 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1955) ; accord, Culberson v State Rd. Dep't, 165 So.2d 255 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1964).
64. Yoder v. Sarasota County, 81 So.2d 219, 221 (Fla. 1955).
65. Casey v. Florida Power Corp., 157 So.2d 168 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). See also Walter v.
Schuler, 176 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1965). In State Rd. Dep't v. Chicone, supra note 62, the supreme
court was faced with an alleged conflict between the district court's decision and Sunday v.
Louisville & Nashville Ry., 62 Fla. 395, 57 So. 351 (1912). The court, however, distinguished
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In the more recent case of Gleason v. State Rd. Dep't,6 the district
court once again used the test of the Yoder case,6" and reiterated that the
value of the property at the time of the taking, as depreciated or de-
pressed by the prospect of condemnation, is not a proper basis for mea-
suring compensation for property taken. However, Judge Allen's state-
ments in the Gleason case appear to be a call for legislative re-evaluation
of this problem:
Perhaps the time has arrived for the reexamination of the pres-
ent system of compensation in eminent domain. We feel, how-
ever, that this is not a proper undertaking of the judicial branch
of our State government. The responsibility rests with the legis-
lative branch, and any redress of the inequities of the existing
system must be sought in the channels connected therewith.6"
2. JUST VALUATION
With regard to the classification of property for purposes of just
valuation the court in Lanier v. Overstreet,6 9 dealt with a statute provid-
ing that lands used for agricultural purposes would be assessed as
agricultural lands on an acreage basis regardless of the fact that any
or all of the lands were embraced in a plot or subdivision or other real
estate development. The court held that the statute provided a valid
legislative classification of agricultural lands. The "uniformity" require-
ment of Article IX, section 1 was held to be applicable only to the rate




A taking under eminent domain must be for a public purpose, and
there must be just compensation for the taking. If the taking is con-
fiscatory as it was in the case of Glisson v. Hancock,70 it will be invali-
between the two. While the Sunday case dealt with the effect on value caused by anticipa-
tion of a proposed public improvement, Chicone dealt with the effect on the value of land
of the imminence of its being taken. In addition, in Sunday there was the possibility of an
increase in value; in Chicone the prospects of anything other than a decrease in value were
very remote. Therefore, as the court in the Chicone case put it, compensation should be
based on the value of the property at the time of the taking as if it had not been sub-
jected to the debilitating threat of condemnation.
The whole purpose of the constitutional provisions relating to compensation for property
condemned is to insure that the property owner will be adequately and fairly compensated
in money for property which is taken from him. See also State Rd. Dep't v. Abel Inv. Co.,
165 So.2d 832 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). The right of condemnees to damages for business
losses as consequence of taking of land is derived solely from statute and not from the "full
compensation" provision of the constitution.
66. 178 So.2d 199 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
67. Yoder v. Sarasota County, 81 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1955).
68. Supra note 66, at 201.
69. 175 So.2d 521 (Fla.- 1965).
70. 132 Fla. 321, 181 So. 379 (1938).
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dated as a denial of due process. In the Glisson case legislation was en-
acted permitting any person to impound hogs, goats and sheep running
at large. Fifty cents could be demanded for each day the animal was
impounded, up to twelve days preceding their sale. The act was held
invalid as confiscatory because the fees were unreasonable, in that they
greatly exceeded the value of the animals.
2. WHO IS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION?
Whenever it appears that there has been a "taking" of land it is
not merely the owner of the fee who is entitled to compensation. Every
person holding a legally or equitably cognizable interest in the subject
matter is equally protected. The fact that the interest of such person
is less than the full interest has no bearing upon the right to compensa-
tion.71 Thus, a lessee for a term of years is, for purposes of the eminent
domain statute, an "owner" and is entitled to recover damages.
72 Simi-
larly, in a proceeding to condemn a private road as an easement for a
public way the court held that owners of interests in a private road
were entitled to compensation, since a portion of the road had long
been used by the owners for private use. 8
E. Restrictive Covenants
The Supreme Court of Florida dealt with restrictive covenants on
realty in the case of Griffin v. Sharpe.74 Private parties in individual
deeds of conveyance imposed restrictions on the use of the land con-
veyed. The restrictions ran for a definite period of time. Legislation had
been enacted to remove such an expiration date and discontinue the re-
strictions. The court declared the act invalid as constituting a taking of
property without just compensation.
F. Inverse Condemnation
City of Jacksonville v. Schumann75 was a case of first impression in
Florida. It involved the concept of "inverse condemnation," which is a
cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the values
of property taken in fact, even though the power of eminent domain has
not been formally invoked. In Schumann jet aircraft using the airport
operated by the city were shown to have flown at altitudes less than
71. NicHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.1(2) (Rev. 3d ed. 1963).
72. State Rd. Dep't v. White, 161 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1964).
73. City of Miami Beach v. Belle Isle Apt. Corp., 177 So.2d 884 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
An easement or other right to use adjourning property can have considerable value when
used in connection with adjourning property owned in fee. City of Jacksonville v. Shaffer,
107 Fla. 367, 144 So. 888 (1932). See generally 29A Am. JUa. Eminent Domain §§ 107-126
(1965).
74. 65 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1953).
75. 167 So.2d 95 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
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five hundred feet above the owner's adjacent property, caused terrific
vibrations, concussions and sound waves while warming up engines, and
caused exhaust fumes, gases and heavy black smoke to be transmitted to
adjacent property. The property owners were held to be entitled to re-
cover from the city on the theory of inverse condemnation. The court
reasoned that the theory is founded upon an acknowledgement that the
doctrines of nuisance and continuing trespass may ripen into a constitu-
tional taking of property within the area of the provisions prohibiting
the taking of property without just compensation. 76 Such a theory has
already been recognized in Florida.77
IV. ZONING
A. Generally
As the area of zoning is extensively dealt with in another article in
this issue of the Law Review, only a sketch of the relationship of sub-
stantive due process and zoning will be discussed here.
78
Under substantive due process standards the Florida courts have
granted zoning officials a healthy range of discretion in promulgating
orders and regulations. As applied to the property in question the zoning
requirement must not be unreasonable; 79 however, there is a presump-
tion that the zoning ordinance is valid, so that the owner bears a heavy
burden of proving the ordinance invalid. 80 Furthermore, Florida courts
repeatedly refuse to substitute their judgment for that of the zoning
officials where the question of reasonableness is "fairly debatable."'" As
in other areas, restrictions on the use of the property must be predicated
upon the safety, health, morals or general welfare of the community.
Nonetheless, when a zoning ordinance has the effect of completely de-
priving the owner of the beneficial use of his property, the ordinance
must be altered or amended so as to prevent a confiscation of property
without due process.82
The traditional position of the Florida courts is demonstrated by
76. Id. at 102.
77. State Rd. Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So.2d 868 (1941).
78. Harris, Zoning, 20 U. MIAMI L. REv. 195 (1966).
79. Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1955).
80. Miami Beach United Lutheran Church v. Miami Beach, 82 So.2d 880, 882 (Fla.
1955). City of Miami Beach v. Silver, 67 So.2d 646 (1953).
81. City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, 86 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1956). See Alloway & Knight,
Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, supra note 58, at 714.
An ordinance should not in its application deprive the owner of a reasonable use and
enjoyment of his own property thereby depriving him without due process of law or just
compensation. Ehinger v. State, 147 Fla. 129, 2 So.2d 357 (1941); Ex parte Wise, 141 Fla.
222, 192 So. 872 (1940).
82. Ehinger v. State, ibid.; State v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 1241, 133 So. 114
(1931) (physician); State v. Du Bose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4 (1930) (removal by hospital
board).
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the opinion in Blank v. Town of Lake Clarke Shores,3 which involved
an ordinance restricting property in a certain area to single family resi-
dences. In upholding the ordinance the court stated that, since under the
circumstances it could not be said that the restriction of the zoning
ordinance was not reasonably related to the public welfare, the question
was at least fairly debatable. Therefore, the court could not substitute
its judgment for that of the legislative body of the town.
B. Aesthetic Zoning
Zoning, based on aesthetic considerations, has been sustained at
times by Florida courts. For example, in International Co. v. Miami
Beach 4 there was a zoning ordinance which permitted coffee shops and
cocktail lounges in hotels for the use of guests only when the facilities
had no entrance from the outside. The apparent intention was to have
these lounges used only by guests of the hotel. Signs were put up to ad-
vertise and were found to be in violation of a zoning ordinance since they
appeared to be designed to attract non-guests. The court upheld the
conviction, and hence the comprehensive zoning plan, because the
"general welfare" of this particular community depended upon preserv-
ing its beauty. Aesthetic values, where necessary to the general welfare
in certain resort communities, such as Miami Beach, warrant aesthetic
regulation of the use of property."5
The cases dealing with sign ordinances present an interesting as-
pect of zoning regulation. The leading case in this area is Sunad Inc. v.
City of Sarasota.86 In Sunad the city adopted an ordinance which limited
the size of wall signs in business and industrial districts and put them
into two classifications denominated "point of sale" and "non-point of
sale." The "point of sale" signs were not limited in size, but "non-point
of sale" signs were limited to three hundred square feet. All other signs
in the city were limited to one hundred and eighty feet.
The court concluded that aesthetic considerations could be a valid
purpose for regulating advertising signs in Sarasota since that city is a
center of culture and beauty; hence aesthetics are a factor properly to
be considered by the city commissions of centers of culture and beauty.
However, the court invalidated the ordinance because it was unreasonable
and discriminatory.
The due process aspects of this decision have been generally fol-
lowed and zoning ordinances regulating signs will be upheld under
83. 161 So.2d 683 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
84. 90 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1956).
85. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364 (1941). See
Merrit v. Peters, 65 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1953) (size of commercial signs).
86. 122 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1960).
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due process attack if they are shown to have a solid foundation in some
reasonable relation to the general welfare of the community.8"
C. Distance
Distance requirements in zoning laws have also generally been up-
held in Florida. For example, a one thousand foot distance between
liquor stores was sustained; the court condoned the basic purpose of such
restrictions as legitimately founded in the protection of the health and
morals of the general public.88 Similarly, distance requirements between
filling stations and churches,8" and between two filling stations," have
been upheld. In City of Miami v. Walker91 the city permitted several
hundred filling stations to construct within the distance prohibitions of
an ordinance requiring that filling stations be seven hundred and fifty
feet apart. The court believed that this did not constitute a waiver of
the ordinance vis-a-vis owners who sought a variance from such regula-
tion. The city was on uneasy constitutional grounds in liberally constru-
ing its prohibitory ordinance. As a general rule it is easier to validate
a zoning ordinance under substantive due process, if the city has a master
zoning plan and does not grant variances under it. Sometimes one vari-
ance can make a whole area of zoning debatable.
D. Strip Zoning and Set Back Ordinances
Strip zoning9" and set back ordinances93 have also been upheld if
they meet the traditional tests under substantive due process.
E. Economic Zoning
Zoning for economic considerations is invalid under substantive
due process. In the case of Miami Springs v. Scoville94 an ordinance
regulating the size and location of advertising signs displayed by gasoline
filling stations was invalidated. The plaintiff sold an unusual product in
that he only sold high test gasoline, and did so at a price competitive
with regular gasoline sold by other dealers. His earnings dropped when
he complied with the ordinance, and hence filed suit. In invalidating the
ordinance the court rejected it as a regulation of advertising designed
to prevent price wars between dealers. The ordinance, motivated by a
desire to regulate economic competition, does not have the necessary rela-
tion to the general welfare, safety, health and morals.
87. See Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1963); Abdo v. City of
Daytona Beach, 147 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
88. Glackman v. City of Miami Beach, 51 So.2d 294 (Fla. 1951).
89. City of Miami v. Thompson, 169 So.2d 838 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
90. City of Miami v. Walker, 169 So.2d 842 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
91. Ibid.
92. Edelstein v. Dade County, 171 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
93. Sharrow v. City of Dania, 83 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1955).
94. 81 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1955).
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F. Changing the "Fairly Debatable Rule"
An interesting possibility with relation to the "fairly debatable rule"
has recently developed. The Burritt case95 involved a suit by owners of
property to enjoin county officials from enforcing zoning regulations
affecting their property. The court first stated the general proposition
that if the zoning restriction exceeds the bounds of necessity for the
public welfare it must be stricken as an unconstitutional invasion of
property rights under substantive due process. It then went on and found
this to be the case in Burritt and held that the plaintiff sustained his
burden of proving that his property was unsuitable for the classification
it had been given.
To substantiate the position that the "fairly debatable rule" is
changing, two second district cases must be examined. In the first of
these cases,"6 an owner's property was no longer adaptable for residential
purposes and evidence failed to establish that restricting his land to a
residential use was substantially related to the health, safety, morals and
welfare of the town in which the property was located. The court stated
that the refusal of the town to rezone the property to a commercial
classification constituted an abuse of discretion. Besides following the
traditional view that changes in the physical character of land from
natural causes may warrant relaxation of the zoning board's restrictions
to prevent classification,97 the court apparently reversed the normal pre-
sumption of validity under the fairly debatable rule by stating that
the zoning authority has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the zoning restrictions under attack relate sub-
stantially to the public health, morals, safety or welfare of the com-
munity.
When confronted with a similar situation in a subsequent case98 the
second district seemed to retract from its earlier position when it found
an ordinance "not fairly debatable" because it was arbitrary and un-
reasonable in its application. However, the court again reiterated its dis-
pleasure with the "fairly debatable" test by saying that zoning boards
are not infallible and that their ordinances and regulations would be




It is recognized that the preservation of the public health is one of
the prime duties of the state, thus, the enactment and enforcement of
95. Burritt v. Harris, 172 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1965).
96. Lawley v. Town of Golfview, 174 So.2d 767 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
97. Ex parVe Wise, 141 Fla. 222, 192 So. 872 (1940); State v. City of Jacksonville,
101 Fla. 1241, 133 So. 114 (1931).
98. Watson v. Mayflower Property, Inc., 177 So.2d 355 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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necessary and reasonable" health laws and regulations is a legitimate
exercise of the police power inherent in the state. 100 Constitutional pro-
visions are liberally construed to uphold acts to protect the community's
health.' 01
When the validity of health regulations is questioned the test gen-
erally used by the court is whether the regulations have some actual and
reasonable relation to the maintenance and promotion of the public
health, and whether health is in fact the end sought to be attained.0 2
Reasonable laws and regulations have been enacted and judicially
approved to govern, inter alia, the practice of medicine, 0 3 the sale of
drugs,'0 4 the prevention of the spread of contagious diseases,'0 5 the pre-
vention and elimination of disease among people'06 and animals,107 the
prohibition of the sale of impure and unwholesome food,'08 and the gov-
erning of drainage and disposal of sewage.0 9
B. Physicians
Physicians who obtain a license to practice medicine in Florida do
so with full knowledge of the state's inherent power to enact laws and
promulgate rules and regulations controlling the practice of medicine.
This privilege of license, once extended, may be withdrawn when it be-
comes necessary to preserve the public health, morals, comfort, safety
and good order of society." 0
C. Pharmacy
There must be a substantial relation between the regulation and
public health, not a weak one. In the Stadnick case,"' the Florida Board
of Pharmacists promulgated a regulation prohibiting licensed pharmacists
99. State v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 726, 27 So.2d 118 (1946).
100. Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So.2d 267 (1943).
101. Ball v. Branch, 154 Fla. 57, 16 So.2d 524 (1944).
102. Supra note 98.
103. North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Mizell, 148 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1962); State v. Davis,
143 Fla. 236, 196 So. 491 (1940).
104. Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1962) (pharmacist); State v.
Leone, 118 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1960) (pharmacist).
105. Moore v. Armstrong, 149 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1963) (tuberculosis); Moore v. Draper,
57 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1952) (confinement); Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So.2d 267
(1943) (venereal disease).
106. City Comm'n of Fort Pierce v. State, 143 So.2d 879 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) (fluorida-
tion of water).
107. Florida Livestock Bd. v. Gladden, 76 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1954).
108. Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 208 F. Supp. 899 (N.D. Fla. 1962)
(milk); Borden Co. v. Odham, 121 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1959) (milk); Shiver v. Lee, 89 So.2d
318 (Fla. 1956) (milk); L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121 (1931) (arsenic
spray); Lewis v. Florida State Bd. of Health, 143 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
109. State v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 726, 27 So.2d 118 (1946) (sewer).
110. State v. Davis, 143 Fla. 236, 196 So. 491 (1940).
111. Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., supra note 104.
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or owners of retail drugstores from advertising the name or price of
tranquilizing drugs or antibiotics which could be purchased only by
prescription. The rationale behind the regulation was a fear that if
certain drugs were advertised there would be pressure on doctors to
prescribe them. The court invalidated the regulation, noting that the
Board's findings dealt with the welfare of physicians and not pharmacists.
This was found to be an unreasonable intrusion upon private rights and
completely lacking in relation to the public health. The court found,
instead, that the regulation was not an effort to protect the public health,
but rather an economic regulation prohibiting price competition. Substan-
tive due process disallows such an economic regulatory purpose.
D. Contagious Diseases
With regard to contagious diseases, it is generally held that a per-
son with such a disease can be confined against his will if necessary. For
example, in Moore v. Draper,"' a statute relating to compulsory isola-
tion and hospitalization of tubercular persons was held a proper exercise
of the police power and not violative of due process.
E. Health Improvement
Improvement of health was the supporting rationale of legislation
attacked in City Comm'n of the City of Fort Pierce v. State."' The pre-
cise question was whether a city had the authority to fluoridate water.
Even though the court recognized a logical distinction between preserv-
ing and improving health, they concluded that the question of whether
a particular health measure is a reasonable or legitimate exercise of
the police power does not turn upon this distinction. As the court con-
sidered fluoridation a valid health measure, the attributes of fluoridation
were not in issue. The only question was whether the city had the au-
thority to fluoridate the water, and the court believed that it did.
F. Sewage
A Miami city ordinance authorizing shutting off water service of any
consumer who failed to pay sewer service charges, was held constitutional
and not a deprivatibn of property without due process. Water and sewer
services are so interlocked that neither can be effective without the other.
The court was aided in its determination by a showing that the situa-
tion, as it existed in Miami at the time, constituted a serious menace to
112. 57 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1952). Upheld in Moore v. Armstrong, 149 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1963)
(isolation and hospitalization of tubercular persons). See Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571,
15 So.2d 267 (1943) (venereal disease-patient had gonorrhea and was quarantined). See also
Florida Livestock Bd. v. Gladden, 76 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1954) which held that an act per-
mitting destruction of diseased animals without compensation, and under certain reasonable
conditions, was valid as a health measure.
113. 143 So.2d 879 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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the health of the inhabitants of the city. The court thus found an urgent
and imperative need for the existing sewer system to be extended, and
hence for the ordinance.114
G. Food Cases
Price fixing, with at least a nominal relation to public health, is
valid in Florida. This point is illustrated by the cases dealing with the
milk industry. Borden Co. v. Odham,"5 exemplifies the sustainable broad
powers of the Florida Milk Commission. The Commission was authorized
to compel distributors to accept any part of the milk produced and
delivered to them by their producers, regardless of the distributor's
need or desires. In addition, the Commission could require distributors
to pay for all milk at minimum prices fixed by the Commission. After
noting that the evils that prompted such a delegation of the state's po-
lice power were the "unhealthful, unfair, unjust, destructive ...trade
practice, which had grown up and been carried on in the production,
sale and distributions of milk ... imperiling the constant supply of pure




Regulations dealing with public safety, enacted by virtue of the
police power, usually are valid under substantive due process stan-
dards.""
B. Railroads
Regulations of railroads on the basis of safety present a peculiar
dichotomy. In Weeks v. Welch" 8 the court upheld the power of the
state to pass regulations requiring trains to stop and be preceded by a
flagman over-a crossing, where the crossing was not protected by a flag-
man or electrical equipment. On the other hand, there is the case of
Loftin v. City of Miami"9 where a safety ordinance was enacted which
114. Supra note 109.
115. 121 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1959). See Shiver v. Lee, 89 So.2d 318 (Fla. 1956). See also
Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 208 F. Supp. 899 (N.D. Fla. 1962). For a case
dealing with the citrus industry see L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121
(1931) (criminal offense to use arsenic sprays on bearing citrus trees held constitutional).
On the other hand, where a regulation of the State Board of Health governing commercial
spraying of lawns and ornamental shrubbery in residential areas with toxic pesticides was
so vague and indefinite as to constitute a violation of due process. See Lewis v. Florida State
Bd. of Health, 143 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
116. 121 So.2d, at 632.
117. Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, 16 U. MIAmi L. REv.
685 (1962). Smith v. City of Gainesville, 93 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1957). For a case involving
Florida's gun statute see Davis v. State, 146 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1962).
118. 92 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1957). See Atlantic, S. R. & G. Ry. Co. v. State, 42 Fla. 358, 29
So. 319 (1900) (reasonable exercise of police power).
119. 53 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1951).
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limited the speed of trains and required them to stop at crossings, un-
less certain safety devices were installed. The court found the expense
would be great for the railroad to conform to the ordinance and it was
invalidated as unreasonable. Therefore, it is quite difficult to say just
what the position of Florida is with relation to railroad crossing regu-
lations." o
C. Motor Vehicles
The greatest number of regulations are in the area of motor vehicles
and traffic. The courts have long recognized that a motor vehicle is a
dangerous instrumentality and that the regulation of the use of such
vehicles, a privilege rather than a right, is a proper matter for the police
power. The state has the power to require licenses under appropriate con-
ditions.' 2 ' An interesting case in connection with licenses is City of Miami
v. Aronovitz. 22 Involved was the implementation of a Florida statute re-
quiring a person to have his operator's license in his possession at all
times while operating a motor vehicle. The operator is required to dis-
play it upon demand of a police officer. The plaintiff refused to show
his license when stopped at a massive roadblock set up for the purpose,
inter alia, of checking licenses. In view of the police power safety pur-
pose behind the regulation it was validated. Roadblocks are the only
practical method of determining whether persons are driving with licenses
which have been suspended or revoked. The court also noted that this
regulation did not have significant injurious impact on the use of the
highways.
In Larson v. Warren,1 2' Florida's Financial Responsibility Act 124
was validated. The act required owners and operators of vehicles in-
volved in an accident to respond for damages and show proof of financial
ability to respond for damages in future accidents, as a requisite for
the further exercise of the privilege to drive. Interestingly employing the
reasoning of Buck v. Bell,12' and recognizing the dangerous propensities
of an automobile, the court held the statute valid as an attempt to promote
public safety and to provide security for those injured in an accident. 126
Traffic is another subject matter properly regulated by the state.
In Tamiami Trail Tour Inc. v. City of Orlando127 an ordinance was
120. By way of note, the Weeks case, supra note 118, was the later in time.
121. Smith v. City of Gainesville, 93 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1957); Miami Transit Co. v.
McLin, 101 Fla. 1233, 133 So. 99 (1931).
122. 114 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1959). See Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional
Law, supra note 117, at 721.
123. 132 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1961).
124. FLA. STAT. § 324.011 (1963).
125. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Sterilization of mental defectives was the issue here. The case
is the source of Justice Holmes' famous declaration, "three generations of imbeciles are
enough."
126. See Semet, Florida Constitutional Law, 18 U. MiAmi L. REv. 888 (1964).
127. 113 So.2d 723 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959). In City of Miami v. Girtman, 104 So.2d 62
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enacted which required common carriers to obtain permits from the city
in order to utilize the city's loading zones. The purpose of the ordinance
was to eliminate traffic hazards, and was upheld as well within the police
power since its basis was safety.
128
D. Comparative Negligence
The recent case invalidating the Comparative Negligence Statute,'129
while being based primarily on equal protection, had some interesting
substantive due process aspects. The statute was originally enacted in
1887. At that time the legislature in exercising its police power in the
interest of public safety could validly deal with the then sole dangerous
instrumentality operated in the state. However, the court recognized that
times have changed; a statute valid when enacted may become invalid
by changes in the conditions to which it applies." 0 The court invalidated




The state's police power extends to the regulation of its citizen's
morals, and such regulations are upheld when they are neither un-
reasonable nor arbitrary.
B. Liquor
The sale of liquor is considered to be closely related to morals and
the state can regulate the liquor industry in various ways. An illustra-
tion of an invalid exercise of the police power was the early case of
In re Seven Barrels of Wine 131 involving a statute which prohibited the
possession of alcoholic beverages in conjunction with the eighteenth
amendment. The court believed that it was unreasonable for the state
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1958) parking lot operators were denied ingress and egress under a city
ordinance, on one of two streets running on either side of their lot. Permission was denied
because of the traffic difficulties incident to the nearby fire station.
128. In Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 75 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1954) the court
validated an act forcing a utility to relocate its facilities to accommodate a new highway
and declared that highways provide one of the clearest fields for the exercise of the police
power. In Garvin v. Baker, 59 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1952), a city ordinance provided a minimum
requirement for streets and sidewalks. A plot was to have an area for sidewalks with the
remainder to be used for street and curb purposes, and all dead end streets were to show
a turning circle. Such an ordinance was reasonable and did not deprive property owners
of property without due process.
129. Georgia So. & Fla. Ry. Co. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 175 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1965).
For a further discussion see Eaton, Florida Equal Protection, 20 U. MiAMi L. REV. 132
(1966).
130. Caldwell v. Mann, 157 Fla. 633, 26 So.2d 788 (1946); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
v. Ivey, 148 Fla. 680, 5 So.2d 244 (1941).
131. 79 Fla. 1, 83 So. 627 (1920).
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to destroy the right to acquire, possess and protect such alcoholic prop-
erty lawfully acquired, and possessed for a legal purpose before enact-
ment of the statute. The wine owner was not afforded a reasonable op-
portunity to lawfully dispose of the property before seizure; this was
unreasonable unless, because of its nature, the property jeopardized the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare, or the property was
knowingly used in violation of the law to the detriment of the public.
An illustration of the permissible use of the police power in rela-
tion to the liquor industry is Lea fer v. State." 2 Legislation prohibited
the issuance of motel liquor licenses except to the owner or lessee of a
motel. Prior to the enactment of the law, the plaintiff had purchased a
liquor license from a motel owner. The effect of the law was to disallow
the renewal of the license except by issuance to the lessee or motel
owner. The court upheld the legislation, basing its decision on the broad
police power in this area.
C. B-Girls
Ordinances against B-girls have also been upheld. Such ordinances
usually prohibit female employees of drinking establishments from ac-
cepting drinks paid for by the customers. Such conduct is considered
to be immoral and can reasonably be regulated by the state. 3 '
D. Gaming and Gambling
Gaming and gambling are also areas subject to valid exercise of
the police power. As the Supreme Court of Florida has put it: "The
sovereignty in the exercise of its police power may enact such laws as
are necessary to protect certain inalienable rights of the public, includ-
ing the protection of good morals."'3 4 Therefore, legislation making it un-
lawful for public utilities to knowingly lease private wires for use in
dissemination of information in the furtherance of gaming,3 5 or racing, 3 '
have been upheld. Gambling machines can also be confiscated by the
state without compensation,3 7 and their use is validly prohibited by
statute.y8
132. 104 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1958). See Keating v. State ex rel. Ausebel, 173 So.2d 673
(Fla. 1965).
133. City of Miami v. Jiminez, 130 So.2d 109 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961) (ordinance vali-
dated-MAMI FLA. CODE § 4-10 (1957)). In City of Miami v. Kayfetz, 92 So.2d 798 (Fla.
1957), an ordinance making it unlawful for female employees and entertainers to mingle or
fraternize with customers was held valid as a reasonable exercise of the police power; but
a provision precluding employees from drinking in place was unreasonable exercise of power.
134. Eccles v. Stone, 134 Fla. 113, 119, 183 So. 628, 630 (1938).
135. McInerney v. Ervin, 46 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1950).
136. State v. Ucciferri, 61 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1952).
137. Pasternack v. Bennett, 138 Fla. 663, 190 So. 56 (1939).




The state's police power is not confined to preservation of life,
health, order and decency, but may extend to laws providing for the
detection and prevention of fraud.13 9 The Florida Citrus Commission
promulgated regulations establishing production standards and labeling
requirements for "chilled orange juice," including a prohibition against
the inclusion of any additives. The plaintiff in Florida Citrus Comm'n v.
Golden Gift Inc.141 wanted to add sugar. The Commission's action to
protect the public against fraud and deception was upheld as a valid
exercise of the police power by regulation of the standards of Florida's
citrus industry.
The supreme court invalidated a law.4' which prohibited the sale
or exchange of new and used motor vehicles on Sunday, in Moore v.
Thompson.4 ' The court insisted that free enterprise should not be regu-
lated in this fashion, employing the usual presumption of invalidity to
any regulation which had a tendency to prohibit business activity. The
court refused to find reasonable a relation between fraud or deception
and the prohibitions of the statute. In finding this law unreasonable the
court disregarded the legislative finding of the relation to fraud by say-
ing: "Findings of fact made by the legislature do not carry with them a
presumption of correctness if they are obviously contrary to proven and
firmly established truths of which courts may take judicial notice."'43
VIII. REGULATION OF BUSINESSES AND OCCUPATIONS
A. Affected with a Public Interest
1. GENERALLY
Generally the legislature may more strictly regulate those persons
or corporations engaged in any trade or business "affected with a public
interest."'
1 44
The phrase "affected with a public interest" is interpreted to mean
that the occupation or industry closely affects the health, safety, and
welfare of the people. In such areas the public is interested to such an
extent that reasonable laws can be enacted for control and regulation.
The extent to which an occupation may be regulated necessarily varies
with the different kinds of businesses. 5
139. State v. Rose, 97 Fla. 710, 122 So. 225 (1929).
140. 91 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1956).
141. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-295.
142. 126 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1960).
143. Id. at 549-50. See Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, 16 U.
Mumi L. REV. 685 (1962).
144. Lambert v. State, 77 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1955).
145. McRae v. Robbins, 151 Fla. 109, 9 So.2d 284 (1942).
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2. TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION
An ordinance making it unlawful for drivers of taxicabs, or any other
passenger vehicle for hire, to solicit the patronage of passengers for
hotels or apartment houses was held reasonable and valid in the case of
State v. Yocum.'" The court determined that though the fundamental
right to earn a living is protected by due process and cannot be abrogated,
it may, nonetheless, be subject to reasonable regulation. Some of the
evils sought to be corrected by the ordinance regulating the taxicab in-
dustry were: avoidance of deceptive practices, harmful misrepresentation,
annoyance of tourists, unethical practices of hotels and apartment houses,
and traffic problems.
The legislature is normally permitted to heavily regulate both trans-
portation and communication companies with regard to rates and prac-
tices. In Greyhound Corp. v. Carter 47 the railroad commission denied a
petition to Greyhound to discontinue a scheduled route. If the company
abandoned the service one result would be to completely deprive a
number of commuters of all public transportation facilities. The court
set forth the standard required in order to frustrate an order to abandon
such public service. It is necessary that the transportation company show
that the facility was being operated at a loss and that the loss affected
substantially the overall operation of the company.
a. Rate Determination
While substantive due process disallows state regulatory agencies
from fixing a confiscatory rate structure for a corporation affected with
a public interest, it is the overall company operation which furnishes the
proper factors to be used by the regulatory agency in fixing the lawful
charges for the use of the company facilities.1
48
A case dealing with rate fixing was General Tel. Co. v. Carter.4 9
The petitioning telephone company was a Florida corporation conduct-
ing a general telephone business in the state, including local and long
distance service. Through its connections with other companies within
Florida and other states the telephone company provided long distance
service outside of the territory it serviced. The court was bound by
federal decisions stating that where the business of the carrier is both
interstate and intrastate, the question of whether a scheme of maximum
146. 136 Fla. 246, 186 So. 448 (1939). The court declared that when a business is
essentially public in character and assumes proportions which may injuriously affect or
menace the welfare, health, safety or public interest, or which may be commonly classified
under the police power, then the business or occupation must be regulated in behalf of the
public welfare.
147. 131 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
148. Ibid.
149. 115 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1959).
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rates fixed by the state for intrastate transportation affords a fair re-
turn must be determined by considering separately the value of the
property being used in the intrastate business, and the compensation
allowed in that business under the rates prescribed. A state cannot
justify unreasonably low rates for domestic transportation, considered
alone, on the ground that the carrier is earning large profits in interstate
business. On the other hand, the carrier cannot justify unreasonably
high rates on the domestic business simply by contending that only in
such a way is it able to meet intrastate business losses. Therefore, the
Commission in fixing rates must separate the corporation's capital de-
voted to the independent spheres of commerce, where a corporation does
both an intrastate and an interstate business.150
b. Communication
A Florida court has validated legislation authorizing the removal of
communication facilities utilized by a hotel in violation of the state's
gambling laws.15' The hotel business was "affected with a public interest"
and the court classified hotels, along with the beverage business, as a
"fit subject for special legislation."' 2
3. INHERENTLY HARMFUL ACTIVITIES
Activities deemed inherently harmful to the public welfare may be
prohibited. Moreover, the state may establish rigidly controlled monopo-
lies when the public interest warrants it. On the other hand, when there
is an absence of a clear public interest, the court will refuse to permit
this kind of interference. 53 One area of such strict regulation is that
of food. In Connor v. Alderman,154 a citrus fruit dealer was required to
keep records of his business. The court stated that it was a proper exer-
cise of the police power for the dealer to be required to keep records
and make them available for inspection, since the business was one of
public interest. The records were not considered private papers and had
to be produced for inspection despite incriminating possibilities to their
maker.
150. Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, supra note 143.
151. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Nineteen Hundred One Collins Ave., 83 So.2d
865 (Fla. 1956).
152. Id. at 871.
153. For an absence of a clear requirement of public interest see Stadnik v. Shell's City,
Inc., 140 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1962) ; Larson v. Lesser, 106 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1958) ; Town of Bar
Harbor Islands v. Schaplik, 57 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1952) ; Liquor Store v. Continental Distilling
Corp., 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949); City of Miami Beach v. Seacoast Towers, 156 So.2d 528
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). But see McRae v. Robbins, 151 Fla. 109, 9 So.2d 284 (1942) where
minimum prices and hours in barber shops were held valid as inclined to make them more
sanitary.
154. 159 So.2d 890 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). See Mayo v. Bossenbury, 10 So.2d 725 (Fla.
1942) (regulation of eggs valid).
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4. CONCLUSION
An invalid attempt at regulation is illustrated in the case of Larson
v. Lesser.'15 Therein, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated an act which
prohibited public insurance adjusters from soliciting business. The court
found no reasonable basis for the legislative restriction and utilized a pre-
sumption of invalidity upon the statute by stating that freedom of con-
tract is the general rule, restraint is the exception. To validate there
must exist a substantial relation between the law and the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare.
Unfortunately, the Florida Supreme Court has not yet eliminated
the label "affected with a public purpose" as suggested by the late Mr.
Justice Terrell:
There is no magic in the phrase "clothed with or affected with
a public interest." Any business is affected by a public interest
when it reaches such proportions that the interest of the public
demands that it be reasonably regulated to conserve the rights
of the public, and when this point is reached, the liberty of
contract must necessarily be restricted .... The regulation...
will be upheld unless clearly shown to be arbitrary, discrimina-
tory or beyond the power of the legislature to enforce. 56
B. Other Examples
The police power is paramount to the right of any person to engage
in a particular business or calling, although the business or calling is
legitimate and is not of such character that it may be entirely forbidden
as hostile to the general welfare.' 5' One's business is a property right,
however, and it cannot be taken, destroyed, nor injured without due
process of law.'5 8 Therefore, the legislature cannot, under the guise of
protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with private business nor im-
pose unnecessary restrictions on lawful occupations.
Based on these concepts a statute regulating real estate brokers and
creating the Real Estate Commission was held constitutional;' 5 9 a statute
requiring that all applicants who desire to take examinations to practice
veterinary medicine and surgery must be a graduate of an accredited
school was validated; 60 statutory classifications, drawn in terms of
monetary cost, governing the right of sons not registered as architects
155. 106 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1958).
156. Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Bd., 134 Fla. 1, 5, 183
So. 759, 763 (1938) (Price fixing of laundry and dry cleaning was sustained on the basis
of general welfare.).
157. State v. Knott, 114 Fla, 120, 122, 154 So. 143, 145 (Fla. 1934).
158. Paramount Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, 104 Fla. 407, 140 So. 328 (1932) (picketted
theatres).
159. State v. Rose, 97 Fla. 710, 122 So. 225 (1929).
160. State v. Dee, 77 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1955).
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or engineers to prepare plans and specifications for one or two family
residences or other buildings was held not violative of due process;' 6'
and an ordinance prohibiting the location of undertaking within a speci-
fied area and prohibiting the practice of embalming without a permit,
was held valid as a regulatory measure adopted in the exercise of police
power.
162
On the other hand, an act regulating and controlling the practice of
photography was held invalid,' as was an ordinance providing that only
licensed auctioneers or owners of goods might conduct an auction."'
Likewise, regulations which would put a security dealer out of business
were invalidated," 5 and a lien put on a bulk purchaser's merchandise was
held a deprivation of property without due process of law.'
Regulation of the accounting profession presents an interesting pic-
ture of substantive due process in Florida. In Heller v. Abessl' 7 a statute
providing for the issuance of certificates to persons who have qualified
as certified public accountants and requiring a license tax for practicing
in the state was held valid. However, in Florida Accountants Ass'n v.
Dandelake,"8 a rule promulgated by the State Board of Accountancy that
only certified individuals could utilize the title of "accountant" in pref-
erence to that of "bookkeeper" was rejected. The court judicially no-
ticed both the need of the small businessman to have ordinary account-
ing work, and the relatively small number of accountants who were
certified by the Board and practicing in the state. Weighing the needs
of the small business and the right to enter into personal employment
contracts against the power of the state to regulate the practice of ac-
countancy, the court reached the conclusion that the police power was
insufficient under substantive due process standards. Therefore as a
result of this decision, individuals have a constitutional right to call
themselves "accountants" rather than "bookkeepers." It is strange that
Florida due process should not be able to accommodate guild efforts. The
justification behind certification of medicine and law would seem to
substantiate the similar regulation of accountancy. A bookkeeping error
can also be disastrous.' 9
161. Richmond v. Florida State Bd. of Architecture, 163 So.2d 262 (Fla. 1964).
162. Hunter v. Green, 142 Fla. 104, 194 So. 379 (1940).
163. Sullivan v. DeCerb, 156 Fla. 496, 23 So.2d 571 (1945).
164. Perry Trading Co. v. Tallahassee, 128 Fla. 424, 174 So. 854 (1937).
165. Riley v. Sweat, 110 Fla. 362, 149 So. 48 (1933).
166. Faber Coe & Gregg, Inc. v. Wright, 178 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
167. 134 Fla. 610, 184 So. 122 (1938),
168. 98 So.2d 323. (Fla. 1957).
169. Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 14 U. Mi.mi L. REv. 501 (1960).
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